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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JESSE E. SMITH, BETH M. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 900277-CA

SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN
ANDERSON and CHARLES L.
APPLEBY, JR.,

Classification Priority 14-b

Defendant-Respondent.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established
by Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for the
reason that this case was initially filed with the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah and transferred to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Honorable Dean
E. Conder, Senior Judge, sitting in the Fifth District Court for
Washington County, finding no cause of action on a claim for
specific performance of a right of first refusal on the sale of
an interest in real property in the State of Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue presented by the appeal is whether or not an
oral telephone conversation may effectively waive a right of

first refusal held by multiple parties
property

in a piece

of real

located within the State of Utah when there is no

compliance

with

the

Statute

of

Frauds,

25-5-3,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
The

statute

that

is

believed

to

be

determinative

this matter is 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

in
A

case which may also be of assistance is G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773
P.2d 841 (Utah App., 1989).

This case is reproduced in total as

part of the addendum to this brief.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was brought to seek specific performance of a
right of first refusal when the Defendant, Salli Smith West, sold
her one-third interest in the Pah Tempe Hot Springs property
located between Hurricane and LaVerkin, Utah, to the Defendants,
Ken Anderson and Charles L. Appleby, Jr.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This matter was tried before the court without
on April 21, 1989.

a jury

The court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and this appeal was brought
thereafter.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
At the trial court level, the Plaintiffs' Complaint to
enforce

the Plaintiffs1

Defendant

Salli

Smith

right
West's

of

first

interest

refusal
in

the

to

purchase

property

was

dismissed with prejudice and the title in the Pah Tempe Hot
2

Springs property held by Salli Smith West was ordered
vested

in

the

Defendants,

Kenneth

R. Anderson

and

Charles

L. Appleby, Jr.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the

settlement

of the

estate

of Elias

Penn Smith,

the Plaintiffs, Jesse Smith, Genevieve Smith, Beth M. Smith, and
the Defendant, Salli Smith West, received title to the property
known

as

the

Pah

Tempe Hot

Springs

located

Hurricane, Utah, and south of LaVerkin, Utah.

just

north of

(T.9, Plaintiffs1

Exhibit No. 1, included in the addendum to this brief.)

Each of

the recipients of the property from the estate of Elias Penn
Smith also stipulated that they would have a right of first
refusal should any of the other recipients of the property desire
to sell their interest in the property.
1985,

Salli

Smith

West

gave

written

Beginning on October 12,
notice

that

she

was

interested in selling her one-third interest in the Pah Tempe
property.

(See Defendants' Exhibit No. 10, T.12.)

On September

4, 1986, Charles Appleby went to Santa Fe, New Mexico, the home
of Salli Smith West, and modified and extended a July 23, 1986,
option to purchase the property by drafting an additional option
to purchase dated September 4, 1986. (T.131-133.)

On or about

September 25, 1986, Salli Smith West telephoned Jesse Smith to
inform him of her intention to sell the Pah Tempe property to
Mr. Appleby and Mr. Anderson, the co-defendants.

(T.73 and 74.)

On or about September 29, 1986, the Plaintiff, Jesse Smith, did
send a letter to Salli Smith West asking for a copy of the
3

Anderson and Appleby offer to purchase.

(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibit

4, a copy of which is attached to this brief in the Addendum.)
(T.35)
the

On or about October 2,

transfer

Appleby.

from

herself

1986, Salli Smith West completed
to

the

Defendants

Anderson

and

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 7, T.68)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The telephone conversation of September 25, 1986, between
Salli Smith West and Jesse Smith could not convey the interest of
the

Plaintiffs, which was a right

of first refusal

in the

property in violation of the statute of frauds.
The defendants

cannot

claim

the

doctrine

of merger to

extinguish the right of first refusal in the deed from the estate
of Elias Penn Smith for the reason that all of the Defendants
were fully aware of the right of first refusal in the Plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD
ORALLY WAIVE OR

CONVEY A VESTED

RIGHT OF FIRST

RUFUSAL TO

PURCHASE AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has ruled that an
option to purchase real estate is an "interest in real estate"
and within the Statute of Frauds.
356 [Utah, 1970])

(Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.2d

This principal has been followed more recently

in the case of Williams v. Singleton, 725 P.2d 421 (Utah, 1986).
The Supreme Court in the Williams, supra., decision relied on the
language found in 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that

4

requires a contract to sell land be "in writing subscribed by the
party to whom the sale is to be made".

In this case now before

the Court, the trial court found
Mr. Smith said that he had no desire to
individually meet the offer of Anderson and Appleby.
The Court finds, based upon the credibility of the
testimony of Salli Smith, that during this telephone
conversation Jesse E. Smith further assured Salli Smith
West that he would send her a letter to the effect that
he would not exercise his first right of refusal.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 18
and attached in the addendum to this brief)
The trial court also found that in his letter of September 29,
198 6, Jesse E. Smith promised to send "a letter signed by Beth,
Gen, and myself releasing you from our option of first right of
refusal."

(Findings of Fact, paragraph 19)

specifically
letter

found that Jesse E. Smith did not provide the

signed

paragraph 23)

The trial court

by

all

of

the

Plaintiffs.(Findings

of Fact,

The trail court also found that the Defendant

Salli Smith West reasonably relied on the telephone conversation
and the letter of September 29, 1986, and closed the sale to
Anderson and Appleby on October 2, 1986, four days before she
sent the documents requested by Jesse E. Smith in his letter of
September 29, 1986. ( Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 20 through 25)
It is the contention of the Appellants that the trial
court

improperly

relied

on

the

telephone

conversation

of

September 25, 1986, and the letter of Jesse E. Smith of September
29, 1986, when the court stated in paragraph 25 of the Findings
of Fact:
By reason of Jesse E. Smith's oral and written
representations, he gave up any claim he may have
5

had under his right of first refusal at that time,
and is now estopped from asserting the same both by
the principles of equitable and promissory estoppel.
The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
apply the Statute of Frauds to this fact situation.

As pointed

out above, an option is subject to the Statute of Frauds.(Coombs
v. Ouzounian, and Williams v. Singleton, supra.)

This Court has

held that a right of first refusal is different from and option
to purchase because a right of first refusal is not binding
unless

the

offeror

decides

to

sell

the property.(G.G.A.

Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App., 1989)

v.

In the present case

Salli Smith West did actually decide to sell her interest in the
property and thereby made the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal
the equivalent of an option.

That interest in land could not be

conveyed without compliance with the Statute of Fratuds.

The

Utah Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the Statute of
Frauds

requirement

that

a

grant

of

realty

be

by

deed

or

conveyance in writing and subscribed by the granting party is to
protect important matters like conveyance of realty from frauds
and perjuries.(Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d
remand 480 P. 2d 137 [Utah, 1969])

467, appeal after

In this case there was no

writing subscribed by any of the Plaintiff's conveying their
right of first refusal.
POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT CLAIM THAT THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER
EXTINGUISHED THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL IN THE DEED
FROM THE ESTATE OF ELIAS PENN SMITH BECAUSE ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS

6

WERE AWARE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT IN THE PROPERTY,
At

the

time

of

the

trial

the

Defendants

raised

the

claim that the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal was merged into
the deed from the estate of Elias Penn Smith and was extinguished
in that instrument because that deed did not reserve the right of
first refusal stipulated by Jesse E. Smith, Genevieve A. Smith,
and Salli Smith West in the estate.(see Plaintiffs1 exhibit #1
and Defendants1

exhibit

#8 and

#9; also see T. 20-21)

The

Defendants supported their claim with the Oklahoma case of Davis
v.

Davis, 632 P.2d

769

(Okla. App., 1981)

The Plaintiffs

answered that the Utah case of G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841
(Utah App., 1989) was more similar to the instant facts.
trial

court

specifically

found

that

the

signatories

The

of the

stipulation in the estate of Elias Penn Smith intended the right
of first refusal to continue between themselves as tenants in
common and as family members after the distribution
estate.( see Findings of Fact, paragraph 12)

of the

This finding of the

court is well founded in the trial transcript where Salli Smith
West (T.60-61), and Charles A. Appleby (T.131-132), and Kenneth
R.

Anderson

(T.

Plaintiffs' right

139)

all

admitted

of

first

refusal

to

being

prior

to

aware
the

of

the

option to

purchase between the Defendants dated September 4, 1986.

With

all of the parties aware of the right of first refusal and the
trial court's reliance on the G.G.A. case, supra, the Defendants
cannot rely on the doctrine of merger to extinguish the right of
first refusal held by the Plaintiffs.

7

CONCLUSION
Because

of

the

failure

of the

Defendants

to

show

any

compliance with the Statute of Frauds in conveying the interests
of the Plaintiffs in the Pah Tempe property, and the knowledge of
all of the parties of the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal, the
trial court's Judgment should be reversed and the sale from Salli
Smith West to the other Defendants should be rescinded.

The

Plaintiffs

the

should

be

given

the

opportunity

to purchase

interest of Salli Smith West under the same terms offered to Mr.
Anderson and Mr. Appleby.

The majority of the payments would now

go to Mr. Anderson and Mr. Appleby, with the final balance due to
Salli Smith West, once they are reimbursed.
DATED this 15th day of August, 1£90.
JAMES L. SHUMATE

ZX

X

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Michael
D. Hughes, THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER, 148 East Tabernacle Street,
St. George, Utah 84770, and Salli Smith West ,546 Onate Place,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, 87501,

this 15th day of August, 1990,

first class postage fully prepaid.

JAMES L. SHUM&TE

MICHAEL W. PARK
Attorney for Peititoner
110 North Main Street, Suite F
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: 586-3879
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

)
)
)

STIPULATION AND PETITION
FOR DISTRIBUTION

ELIAS PENN SMITH, Deceased.

)

Probate No. 2070

The Executrix, Genevieve A. Smith, and all of the
other heirs of the estate, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard, and
Penn Harris Smith, hereby Stipulate and petition the Court as
follows:
1.

The Petitioners, being all of the heirs of the

estate of E. Penn Smith, hereby Petition the Court for distribution
of the property of the estate in accordance with this Stipulation
hereinafter set forth.
2.

The heirs of the estate hereby agree that Genevieve

A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard and Penn Harris
Smith shall each pay twenty five percent (257o) of the total
liabilities of the estate in order to retire all debts which have
been assessed against the estate.

The case payments which

should be made out of the estate at this time amount to a total
of $48,557.00.

The total cash on hand, includes the sum of

$3,557.00, making the net liability payable by the estate in
sum of $45,000.00.

Each heir to the estate, therefore, is

indebted for the liabilities in the sum of $11,250.00.
3.

The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the

property listed in the Inventory and Appraisement and known as
the Industrial property shall be awarded to Penn Harris Smith
and Salli Smith Girard as tenants in common, with Salli Smith
Girard being entitled to twenty-nine percent (297.) of said
property and Penn Harris Smith being entitled to seventy-one
percent (7170 of said property.
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-24.

As consideration for the above, Penn Harris

Smith and Salli Smith Girard agree to pay to Genevieve A.
Smith and Jesse E. Smith the total sum of $12,250.00.

Penn

Harris Smith shall release any and all claim to the Pah Tempe
Springs property, the Magelby property located in Pintura Utah,
and the balance due on the sales contract between Jesse E.
Smith and Elias Penn Smith.

Salli Smith Girard shall release

any and all claim she has to the Magelby property located in
Pintura Utah.

Salli Smith Girard shall also release any and

all interest she has in and to the real estate sales agreement
between E. Penn Smith and Genevieve A. Smith Sellers and
Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith Buyers.
5.

The property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, the

description of which is situated in the Inventory and Appraisement,
should be distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith,
and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in common.
6.

The property known as the Magelby property located

in Pintura Utah should be distributed to Jesse E. Smith and
Genevieve A. Smith as tenants in common, and Penn Harris Smith
and Salli Smith Girard hereby release any and all claim in and
to said property.

The proceeds from the real estate contract

made between Elias Penn Smith and Genevieve. A. Smith and Jesse E.
Smith and Beth M. Smith shall become the property of Jesse E.
Smith and Genevieve A. Smith, and Penn Harris Smith and Salli
Smith Girard shall release any and all Interest in and to said
property.
7.

The persons who take the property described abov>,

shall take their property subject to any and all encumbrance wiich
may exist thereon or any and all lease, rental or other assessnent
which may attach to that property, as of this date.
8. The parties who take the property set forth above
as tenants in common, hereby agree to grant their fellow tenarts
a right of first refusal to buy their interest in said property

-3in the event that tenant wishes to sell.

That tenant shall

advise the co-tenant of his desire to sell and if a bona fide
offer is recieved from a third party, that offer must be met
or the tenant may sell to said third party or any other third
party.

If the tenant desires to excercise the right of first

refusal and a third offer is unavailable, then the interest
shall be determined by an evaluation of the fair market value
of said property which can be accomplished by the appointment
of appraisers by said tenants. Each tenant shall appoint an
appraiser and if the tenants are still in disagreement, those
appraisers shall appoint another appraiser and the decision of
that appraiser shall be final.
9.

The parties have divided the personal property

among themselves.
10. Salli Smith Girard and her husband are presently
indebted to the Estate in the sum of $2,224.00.
11.

The heirs accept the accounting of Genevieve A.

Smith concerning the assets and liabilities of the estate and
further agree with a payment to her of an executrix fee in the
sum of $3,220.00.
12.

All of the parties to this agreement shall be

responsible for one-fourth (1/4) of any additional taxes or
estate debts and same shall be paid by the heirs within 30
days of notification of that debt.
WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray the Court for an
Order distributing the property in accordance with the Petition
and Stipulation set forth above.
DATED, this V ^ d a y

'

of February, 1977.

GENEVIEVE A. SMI

W/3HM
S^^MT^IISD ^ ^ * ^

-4STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF IRON )

88.

Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard,
Penn Harris Smith, being the petitioners in all of the heirs to
the Estate of Elias Penn Smith, hereby state that they have read
the foregoing Petition and Stipulation and are aware of the
contents thereof and duly acknowledge that they signed said
document,
DATED, this /

day of. ^Z\+Xs~~~~N

tm

. 1977..

HARRISvSMlTff

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

/ d a y

1977.

Residi
My Commission expires:

of ^ £ J : > ^

=r

MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No. 1572)
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Attorneys for Defendants Anderson & Appleby
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah
84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE E. SMITH, BETH M. SMITH,
and GENEVIEVE A. SMITH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs,
SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN ANDERSON,
and CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR.,

Civil No. 86-105*
Defendants.
KEN ANDERSON and CHARLES L.
APPLEBY, JR.,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
SALLI SMITH WEST,
Cross-Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on the
21st day of April, 1989, without a jury, and Plaintiffs being
represented
Shumate,

by

and

and

through

Defendants

and

their attorney

of

Cross-Claimants

record
Ken

James

Anderson

L.
and

Charles L. Appleby, Jr. being present and represented by their

2
attorney of record Michael D. Hughes, and Defendant and CrossDefendant Salli Smith West appearing pro se, and the Court having
heard

the

testimony

of the witnesses

and having

received

the

evidentiary support for both Plaintiffs1 unverified complaint and
the defenses proposed by Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and CrossDefendants, and the matter having been briefly argued and supplemented

by written memoranda, now, therefore, the* Court

hereby

enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows,
to-wit:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The pleadings were properly joined for trial, though

a precipe for default and default judgment had been entered against
Defendant and Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West and filed with the
Court on April 14, 1989-

Salli Smith West never filed a reply to

said cross-claim.
2.

This

case

involved

the

Plaintiffs1

collective

request for specific performance of a "right of first refusal"
included in a Stipulation and Petition for Distribution (hereafter
"Stipulation"), arising in the matter of the Estate of Elias Penn
Smith, Washington County Probate No. 2070, and marked and received
into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1 (hereafter P.l).
3.

Part of the estate mentioned in said Stipulation

(P.l) included real property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, which
is the subject matter of the case at bar.
4.

The Stipulation

(P.l) was signed by Genevieve A.

Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Penn Harris Smith, and Salli Smith Girard

3
(n.k.a. Salli Smith West) and provided as follows:
5.
The property known as Pah Tempe Hot
Springs, the description of which is situated
in the Inventory and Appraisement, should be
distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E.
Smith, and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in
common.

8.
The parties who take the property set
forth above as tenants in common, hereby agree
to grant their fellow tenants a right of first
refusal to buy their interest in said property
in the event that tenant wishes to sell.
5.

Penn Harris Smith was not to be named as a tenant

in common to this property and, indeed, was not a party to this
lawsuit.
6.
February

of

Though

the

Stipulation

(P.l)

was

executed

in

1977, the Defendants produced the Decree of Final

Distribution and Order Approving First and Final Account and Report
of

Administration

(hereafter

"Decree"),

which

was

marked

and

received by the Court as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 8 (D.8).
7.

The July, 1977, Decree (D.8) makes no mention of the

right of first refusal, and has attached thereto as Exhibit "B" a
Quit Claim Deed which varies from the Stipulation (P.l) in that the
one-third interest to be awarded to Jesse E. Smith was conveyed to
him

and

his wife

subsequently

Beth M. Smith; and,

further,

said

deed, as

recorded, contains no "first right of refusal" or

other language which would facially limit a grantee-tenant's right
to alienate his or her interest in the same.

4
8.

Beth M. Smith was not a signor

of the

original

Stipulation (P.l) and, further, the Plaintiff Beth M. Smith offered
no testimony at trial and gave no evidence whatsoever therein.
9.

Though Beth M. Smith received, by the Decree and the

deed of conveyance attached thereto

(D.8), an interest

in the

subject-matter property which conceivably mcikes hei: a co-tenant,
that interest did not make her a party to the Stipulation

(P.l)

executed in February of 1977, nor to the right of first refusal
contained in paragraph eight thereof.
10.

Insofar as Beth M. Smith offered no evidence

in

support of her position as a holder of any right of first refusal
as against any of the Defendants, she did not give any evidence
whatsoever to establish any support of her complaint, and, therefore, the same should be dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Defendants contended at trial that the

right of

first refusal contained in the Stipulation (P.l) was merged into
the Decree and the deed which was attached thereto

(D.8).

In

support of this proposition Defendants have cited, inter alia, the
case of Davis v. Davis 632 P.2d 769 (Okla. App.).
12.
App.

The case of G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah

1989) is more in point, in that the Court finds the right of

first refusal to be a collateral agreement to the division and
distribution of the property in the estate.

In so finding, the

Court finds that it was the obvious intent of the signatories to
the

Stipulation

(P.l)

that

the

right

of

first

refusal

would

continue between those signatories as tenants in common and family

a t f -•

members
finds

';

*••..,>•

tfnV~ * h e r e wa:

D e c r e e ana a e e d
a i id

'a

:

lt -

t

considers

.

that

right

said

i •

relu:;.:.

T

•

.-

,(* a; poorer:

c.. t

wnttfi

The C o u r t ,

co-tenant
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agreement on the subject-matter property was modest in light of the
option to purchase the property executed in September of 1986 by
Anderson and Appleby (D.ll).
16.

Anderson and Appleby were aware of the right of

first refusal, and Salli Smith West represented to them that she
would

personally

take care of that

factual

matter

with

those

holding or claiming the right.
17.

On or about September 26, 1986, the Salli Smith West

gave sufficient notice to Jesse E. Smith, by telephone, of the
offer of Appleby and Anderson to purchase her interest
subject-matter property.

in the

This telephone call was made to Jesse E.

Smith while he was at work and is substantiated by the telephone
records

received

into evidence as Defendants1

Exhibit

No. 13.

Though Mr. Smith indicated that he could not be reached by telephone at his place of employment, the Court, en camera and with
counsel

present, made

a call

to the

number

indicated

on the

telephone records and was able to reach Mr. Smith's assistant, who
indicated that Mr. Smith was out of town, but otherwise could have
been telephonically contacted.
18.

Salli Smith West disclosed the nature of the offer

to Jesse E, Smith, and Mr. Smith said that he had no desire to
individually meet the offer of Anderson and Appleby.

The Court

finds, based upon the credibility of the testimory of Salli Smith,
that during this telephone conversation Jesse E. Smith

further

assured Salli Smith West that he would send her a letter to the
effect that he would not exercise his first right of refusal.
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promised letter to Salli Smith West, contrary to both his oral and
written representations.
24.

By

letter

dated

October

13,

1986,

marked

and

received into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 6, Jesse E. Smith
avoided sending the promised letter waiving the right of first
refusal and instead stalled the sending of that letter by requesting documents which the Court finds irrelevant to the right of
first refusal as contained in the Stipulation (P.l).
25.

By reason of Jesse E. Smith's oral

and

written

representations, he gave up any claim he may have had under his
right of first refusal at that time, and is now estopped

from

asserting the same both by the principles of equitable and promissory estoppel,
26.

Salli Smith West, in reliance on the representations

made by Jesse E. Smith, consummated the sale and put herself in a
position

of

breached

and

jeopardy
reneged

by his subsequent

conduct, which

on the promises made both

orally

conduct
and

in

writing to her.
27.

The July 23, 1986, option (P. 17) need not have been

communicated to the Plaintiffs because the same was not accepted
in its form by Salli Smith West, and, as a result, there was no
need, by reason of the original Stipulation (P.l), to communicate
that offer to her other co-tenants.

As Judge Greenwood stated in

the G.G.A. case:
A right of first refusal to purchase
property is different from an option in that
a right of first refusal is not binding unless
the offeror decides to sell the property,
[G.G.A. v. Laventis, supra,]
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had no standing to assert the same at the time of trial.
34.

Beth M. Smith was not a party to the Stipulation

(P.l), and cannot claim any rights under it.

Furthermore, the

position of Beth M. Smith cannot be ascertained by reason of her
failure to offer any testimony or evidence at trial and by reason
of the fact that the complaint stands unverified in the file.
35.

Upon being sued, Anderson and Appleby, by reason of

the Warranty Deed marked and received into evidence as Defendants1
Exhibit No. 1, requested defense of their title from Salli Smith
West.
36.

As the Court has ruled for the Defendants Anderson

and Appleby, affirming their title to Salli Smith West's former
interest

in

the

subject-matter

property,

the

cross-claim

of

Anderson and Appleby for indemnification for their attorney's fees
in defending the title as received under the Warranty Deed (D.l)
from Salli Smith West should, likewise, be denied and dismissed.
37.

Defendants1

attorney, Michael

D. Hughes, offered

testimony, which testimony is uncontroverted, that the attorney's
fees in defending this matter were $6,500.00 through the date of
trial, and Hughes was thereafter instructed by the Court to prepare
further pleadings in conformity to this Court's memorandum decision.
38.

Costs in defending the suit, however, should be

awarded to the prevailing Defendants Anderson and Appleby.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Defendants Anderson and Appleby are not entitled to reimbursement
of attorney's fees despite the issuance of a Warranty Deed to them
by Salli Smith West and despite her representations that she would
take care of the right of first refusal.
7.

A judgment in accordance with the foregoing findings

of fact and conclusions of law should be entered

and

formally

executed by the Court.
DATED this

5

day of J^mi^ry, 1990.

DEAN E. CONDER
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
placed in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with firstclass postage thereon fully prepaid on the

~7 ^ - day of gLa4^uary7/

1990, addressed as follows:
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34720
Ms. Salli Smith West
546 Onate Place
Santa Fe, New Mexico

87c501

H e n d e r s o n * N eu a d a
Sept. 29 1336

Dear Sal W,
i have been unable to t a I K with Gen a.bout, the
SPrin9s. She had t-o taKe so rue hor ses to the
coast and 1 do r iot Know for • si w -e when she wil 1 be
bacK.
I don *" t thi i nK she can come uP w 11h a.r iV
money at t h e P r e s e n t t i m e b e c a u s e s h e is in a b i g
] aw suit in Phoeni x ar id is also be in 9 hour ided b y
the I.R.S. o v e r M o u n t a i n Shadows., I can n o t
h a n d 1 e $ 1 2 5 , © 0 © . © 9 by my s e 1 f .
I- *
IJ] II need from y o u is a copy of t h e i r
o — ^
• bu- PI..I.-* y 3i9ned b* 1 • .ei. -.ud
not Cjr ;,: <
*
* * ' '-- - * .. *--<_- ^ g r e< ••» •* -"" .
I wi 11 -j' *e y o u a letter z. : 9ned by &*--• + h
-en H n d
myself - ^ l e a s i n g y o u from o u r oPf-irv -* <•" -. +
ri9hi
Uncpr

*

CO"" t ~y 1

v -v .
-

-• ""

*"

' *~'U'>'

*

* l i*-

f 1 c-t"^ f © L M y ' ' l

from
flPPleby
* H-i-->-i ?<:•'• ma
l o o k *>oc " b - ^
t h i n K i t is t • -»_•..,
\-<~.\.**- --. : <* I.-.-.,'1 * * - . i - *
than 4^ ^ a r s *o
9 e t M , * f j - <i .*- '
~*
• *
intere y
from
"on* r- .*> «
- v - •, • *
1 .-! s u r e Pt-p , <-r<!
^ <-'»o^r_.on I - J I I . <-<>ar id G e r \ c _ . e * 1 >=** 4. er
V > ' ' P e t -'oo* * a r t ,
w i l l r\B^d s o m e d o c u m e n t . * 4 > _ ' , ,
* * - *>r *

* * -^r

iure
u t
* • me
r

ne'

P s >'* o u rn a. > • o i rn a. y n o t K r i o w a. r i o t f e i t o b u y
rea. 1 P roP e r f y m u s t b e m a d e i n ur 11 i n9 and s i 9 n e d
to b e u a. lid u n d e r U t a h 1 a.w. 1 rnust f ia.ue t h i s
document.a.t i ori i f i t becornes nessesa.ry t o ha.ye a n
a.PPra.is al a.t a. la.t er t i m e . P l e a s e get t h i s o u t
to me s o o n .

your

LoMe
Lirot her

J ^ -;:., <=, p,

:opy :
Gen Smith
.MiKe._Pa.rK.
file
I
9

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
__1 . _

1

E#CO
), Utah

G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis

65

107 Utah Adv. Rep. 65

m.
generally, a juror affidavit can only be used
mpeach a jury verdict when: 1) the verdict
> determined by chance or bribery, Rosef v. Sullivan, 616 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah
3); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304
ah Ct. App. 1987); or 2) when "extraneous
j u d i c i a l information was improperly
mght to the jury's attention or an outside
luence was improperly brought to bear
3n any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); Hillier,
) P.2d at ^ 304. The reason for nar;vly limiting the circumstances under which
•y affidavits can be used to impeach a jury
rdict is that otherwise, litigants would obtain
•or affidavits on "all manner of things" and
t process would become interminable and
practicable. Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R.
x, 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952).
irther, "[s]uch post mortems would be proictive of no end of mischief and render
rvice as a juror unbearable." Id.
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah
>88), the Utah Supreme Court considered
hether a juror's affidavit regarding a divine
velation could be used to impeach the jury's
jrdict under Utah R. Evid. 606(b). In DeMille,
juror affidavit stated that one juror
Jegedly told another juror during deliberat>ns that she had prayed for a sign during
osing argument as to DeMille's guilt and
laimed to have received a revelation that if
efense counsel did not make eye contact,
)eMille was guilty. Defense counsel did not
lake eye contact and DeMille was found
uilty.
In .reviewing whether the juror affidavit
hould have been admitted under Utah R.
:vid. 606(b), the court stated that construing
'outside influence" to include responses to
>rayer could well infringe upon the juror's
eligious liberties. Id. at 84. The court stated
hat as long as the juror can fairly weigh the
evidence and apply the law to the facts, the
luror's decision cannot be challenged on the
ground'that the juror reached the decision by
aid of prayer. Id. Accordingly, the court held
that under Rule 606(b), prayer and supposed
responses to prayer are not included within the
meaning of the words "outside influence." Id.
The court also noted, however, that a juror
might be disqualified from service if he or she
is unable to fairly consider the evidence- and
properly apply the law due to oracular signs. Id.
The court then found that this fact did not
save DeMille's challenge to the verdict for two
reasons. Id, First, the affidavit did not aver
facts which would disqualify a juror. Second,
even if the affidavit averred such facts, the
court stated,
[a] claim that a juror is so affected
by religious conviction as to disqualify him or her from service does

not fall within these exceptions
[Rule 606(b)]; rather it goes to the
• fitness of the person to serve on the
jury, a matter that could and
should have been raised at voir dire.
Id. at 85.
Applying the law to the facts in this case,
we need not reach whether the affidavit
alleged facts that would disqualify any juror
because, according to DeMille, juror affidavits
regarding divine revelations do not fall within
the exception set forth in Rule 606(b). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in
excluding the juror affidavit.
1
We have examined the other issues raised in
this appeal and conclude that those issues are
without merit. Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge;
This case involves real property occupied by
G.G.A., Inc., doing business as a Wendy's
Old Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant, located
at about 550 East 400 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Toula Leventis (Leventis), who leased
the property to G.G.A., appeals from the trial

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

court's summaiy iiidgmciii in fa\ u ol
G.G.A., claiming that her notice to G.G A of
an offer to purchase the property for $210,000
did not obligate her to sell to G.G A. for that
price G.G A., however, contends that Levc
ntis's communication of that offer to G G.A
created an irrevocable option in its favor. We
affirm on the basis that G.G.A. had a right of
first refusal for ninety days after notice of the
offei
In 1977, Leventis leased the subject pi open >
to G.G.A., which constructed a Wendy's Old
Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant on the
premises and commenced doing business. The
parties' lease provided, in Article XIV entitled
Option to Purchase and Right of First
Refusal, that after the expiration of the initial
twenty-five year term of the lease, G.G.A.
would have an option to purchase the property
for an agreed upon price or at market value,
to be determined by three appraisers The
second paragraph of Article XIV stated that
Landlords further covenant and
agree thai in case Landlords shall at
any tune dunng the term ol this
lease intend or desire to sell Land
lords* estate in the demised prcni
ises, 01 it Landlords shall receive \
bona fide offer to purchase said
demised premises, Landlords shall
first notify Tenant of such desire
and intent or of such offer and the
price at which and the terms upon
which Landloids are willing to sell
such estate
1 hereupon, - Tenant
shall have the option, to be exert
ised within ninety (90) days aftei
receipt by Tenant of written notice
from the Landlords to elect to
purchase the demised premises *\\
for such price and upon such stated
terms and conditions.
Finally, the lease provided that in the event of
litigation due to breach, the successful party
would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
and costs.
On September 9, 1986, Leventis received an
offei to purchase the premises for $210,000
from Jimmy P. Brown. On September 15,
1986, Leventis notified G.G A. of the offer
and enclosed A topy of Brown's earnest
money agreement. In early October, prior to
October 28, 1986, Phillip Arlt, on behalf of
G.G.A., orally advised Leventis that G.G.A.
would exercise its option to purchase the premises for $210,000 On October 28, 1986,
Leventis wrote G.G.A a letter stating that
Brown had withdrawn and rescinded the offer.
The letter also stated, "I do want to sell my
property and will entertain new offer(s) to sell
it; accordingly I do not consider myself bound
to sell at the price of $210,000."
On November 20, 1986, Leventis received an
offer from Janus and Associates to purchase

the property for $250,000 and informed
G.G.A. of the offer the following day. On
December 6, 1986, ( I O A wrote Leventis a
lrttei offering $210,0<X) toi the property.
Leventis icfused to sell the property for
$210,000. On February 6, 1987, G.G.A. initiated this action against Leventis, alleging that
G.G.A. was entitled to specific performance
and claiming it was entitled to an injunction to
prevent Janus and Associates from purchasing
lhe property G G.A. paid Leventis $250,000
tor purchase of the property and specificall>
stated that it reserved its right to purchase the
property for $210,000. Closing of the sale and
purchase took place on February 27, 1987.
The warranty deed stated that Leventis conveyed the property for "ten dollars and other
good and valuable consideration." After the
property was purchased, G.G A. amended us
complaint against Leventis to include a cause
of action for breach of contract and to
enforce the $210,000 purchase price.
Both G.G.A. and Leventis filed motions lor
summary judgment. The trial court granted
summary judgment for G.G.A. and awarded it
principal, costs and attorney fees in the
imount ol $44,792.75. Leventis filed this
ippeal raising the following issues: 1) Did
delivery and acceptance of the warranty deed
i onstitute a merger and thereby extinguish
G.G.A.'s rights under the lease? 2) Did Leventis's September 15 letter constitute an irrei ocable option or a right of first refusal? 3)
Did the trial court err in awarding G.G.A.
jltorney fees and costs tinder the lease?
MERGER
I event is asserts that her dcliveiy ol the
warranty deed and G.G.A \ acceptance,
< onstitute merger of the lease into the deed,
thus extinguishing G.G.A's rights under the
lease. As a result, Leventis claims, (3 G A.
cannot assert the parties' lease as the basis for
this action.
I he doctrine of merger provides that upon
delivery and acceptance of a deed, the provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or superseded by the deed Sccor v Knight, 716 P.2d
790, 792 (Utah 1986) However, there are
several exceptions to this doctrine, including
fraud, mistake and the existence of collateral
rights in the contract of sale. Id. at 793.
Under the collateral rights exception, "if the
original contract calls for performance by the
seller of some act collateral to conveyance of
title/' his obligations under the original contract are not extinguished. Stubbs v Hemmert,
<67 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). Whether the
terms of the contract are collateral depends to
a great extent on the intent of the parties Id.
The court applied the collateral rights exception in Stubbs, and found that the parties had
entered into an agreement collateral to the
conveyance of the real property, to the effect

HIAIi MWANO RF PORTS

'

Utah

107 Utah , Jv Rep 65

the seller of the property could remove
in equipment from the building. After
g that the parties' testimony indicated
they clearly intended to allow plaintiff to
ter the property and retrieve his equipafter the deed was delivered, the court
i that the agreement regarding retrieval
le equipment was collateral to the deed
eying the property,
this case, G.G.A.'s attorney wrote a
to Leventis's attorney on February 17,
stating that G.G.A, was exercising its
>n to purchase the property for $250,000.
ever, the letter also stated that G.G.A.
ved that it had timely exercised its option
irehase the property for $210,000. Finally,
;tter stated,
You are further notified that GGA
hereby specifically reserves all of its
rights and remedies under the terms
of that certain Real Estate Ground
Lease and specifically, but not by
way of limitation to, the rights and
remedies provided for in Article
XIV and further reserves all of its
rights and remedies under the September 15, 1986 option and GGA's
timely exercise thereof.
n February 27, 1987, G.G.A.'s attorney
e another letter to Leventis's attorney
irming that Leventis and G.G.A. were
•ving all claims, rights and defenses in the
uit and nothing in the closing was to be
preted as. waiving those claims and defe. The letter specifically stated that G.G.A.
not relinquishing its right to purchase the
>erty for $210,000. Leventis did not
ond to either letter nor otherwise manifest
intention inconsistent with G.G.A.'s
•ess reservation of rights,
pplying the doctrine of merger and the
ateral rights exception to the present case,
find that these letters manifest a clear
nt to preserve the rights set forth in the
e, notwithstanding delivery of the deed. In
ition, similar to Stubbs, the collateral
ter of interpretation of the lease was
rly a question to be resolved after closing
delivery of the deed. Therefore, we hold
the lease was an agreement collateral to
conveyance of the real estate, and delivery
he deed did not extinquish G.G.A.'s rights
ter the lease.
PTION TO PURCHASE OR RIGHT OF
FIRST REFUSAL
Ve now turn to Leventis's claim that the
1 court erred in granting summary judgnt in favor of G.G.A. Leventis claims that
letter of September 15, 1986, informing
3.A. that she had received an offer to
chase the property for $210,000 from
imy P. Brown, did not create an irrevoce option to purchase the premises. Conve-

0_/

rsely, G.G.A. contends that Leventis's letter
triggered an irrevocable option exercisable
within ninety days, to purchase the property
for $210,000.
In reviewing the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, we liberally construe the
facts and view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P. 2d
750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Further,
because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law, we are free to reappraise the
trial court's legal conclusions. Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987).
In interpreting a contract, we determine
what the parties intended by examining the
entire contract and all of its parts in relation
to each other, giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08
(Utah 1982). The cardinal rule is to give effect
to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the contract itself. LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins.
Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a contract should be interpreted so as
to harmonize all of its terms and provisions,
and all of its terms should be given effect if
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
The focal point in this case is whether in
light of the underlying lease provision, Leventis's letter effectuated an option or if it
created a right of first refusal which was open
for ninety days. An option to purchase property is a contract in which the owner of the
property sells to the optionee the right to buy
the property in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the option. Spokane
School Dist. No. 81 v. Parzybok, 96 Wash. 2d
95, 633 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1981). A right of
first refusal to purchase property is different
from an option in that a right of first refusal
is not binding unless the offeror decides to sell
the property. 11 S. Williston, Contracts
§1441A, at 949-50 (3rd ed. 1968); Northwest Television Club, Inc. v. Gross Seattle,
Inc., 26 Wash. App. I l l , 612 P.2d 422, 425
(1980). A right of first refusal limits the
owner's right to dispose of his property by
requiring him to first offer it to the party who
has the right of first refusal. 11 S. Williston,
at 949-50.
Article XIV of the parties' lease, entitled
"OPTION TO PURCHASE AND RIGHT OF
FIRST REFUSAL/ contains two paragraphs.
Although the first paragraph is not applicable
in this case, interpretation of that paragraph
assists our interpretation of paragraph two,
which is the pivotal provision in this case.
Paragraph one states that at any time during
the term of the lease, the tenant has an option
to purchase the premises. If the tenant notifies
the landlord of its intent to exercise that
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option and the parties are unible to igrtt.
upon a price three appraisers will bt selected
to determine the fan market valut of th
property After that value is determined th
tenant has sixt) days to elect to pun hast th<
property In confi i f par ignph (w pioudc
thit
Landlords further covenant and
agree that in case Landlords shall at
any time, during the term of this
lease
receive a bona fide ofler to
purchase said demised premises
Landlords shall first notify Tenant
oi such desire and intent or of such
offer and the price at which Land
lords are willing to sell such estate
Thereupon, Tenant shall have the
option, to be exercised within nmetv
(90) days after receipt by Tenant of
written notice from the Landlords
to elect to purchase the demised
premises
If Tenant exercises said
option withm said ninety (90) day
period of time, the cl6sing of the
purchase and sale shall be consu
mmated with reasonable promptness
thereafter If Tenant shall not e\e
rcise said option landloicis shall
have the right to conclude a sale
howevei
the Tenant's option i
purchase aforesaid and Tenant s
right of firsi refusal as herein con
tamed shall remain in force and be
b i n d i n g u p o n any subsequen
owners
(Emphasis added)
Paragraph one describes an option tc pin
chase the premises^and the method for deter
mining the price The facts of this case indi
cate, however, that the parties were not ope
rating under the provisions of paragraph one
oi Article XIV, because the tenant, G G A ,
did not initiate the discussion regarding pure
hase of the property and the price was set by a
third party rather thin b\ th( parties <r three
appraiseis
We next examine paragraph two to deter
mine if it sets forth a right of first refusal or
an option to purchase and to determine the
effect of Leventis s letter concerning Jimmy
Brown's offer undei paragraph two Parag
raph two requires Leventis to inform G G A
of any bona fide offers she ieceives and the
price at which she is willing to sell the prop
erty Thus, if a third party proposes an offer
and Leventis accepts thai offer Leventis is
obliged to first inform G G A of the offer
and permit G G A ninety days within which
to agree to purchase the proper!) it the
offered and accepted price Pan of th<. conf
usion in this ease appears to stem from use of
the word
option" in paragriph two
Howevei, it appears that the first paragraph
of Article XIV grants an option to purchase
I 1 \M

C O D E * Co
Provo Ufah

while the second paragraph provides a right of
first refusal Therefore the plain meaning of
option" as used in paragraph two is not the
usual technical legal definition, but describes
an alternative right to purchase the property
upon the offered and accepted terms and
conditions of a third party, a right of first
refusal Furthermore, the word option has
been interpreted in at least one other contract
to actually denote a right of first refusal See
Cumnungs v Nitlson, 42 Utah 15 7, 129 p
619 621 (1913) Finally, the last sentence in
paragraph two lends further credence to the
notion that the first paragraph or 'aforesaid'
portion of Article XIV describes an option,
while the second paragraph of Article XIV
"herein" specifies a right of first refusal
Accordingly, paragraph two gives G G A a
right of first refusal and limits Leventis's right
to dispose of the property in that she is com
pclled to permit G G A ninety days to e^er
use its right of first refusal
Applying paragraph two lo the facts oi tins
case, it is clear that Leventis's letter of Sept
ember \Sf 1986 triggered G G A ' s right to
purchase the property on the same terms as
Brown proposed, l e , for $210,000 Leventis
clearly received and accepted an offer from a
third party and informed G G A of that
offei In accordance with the lease, G G A
then had ninety days to exercise its right of
first refusal On Decembei 6, 1986, G G \
timely exercised its right of first rtfu il
onsequently, the trial couit properl) qrant d
ummary judgement in favor of G G A
A T I G R N F ! M ES \ N D * GS1S
Ltventis also contends that the trial court
erred m awarding G G A attorney fees and
costs Attorney fees are generally recoverable
in Utah if provided for by contract E >
Dixie State Bank v Bracken 764 P hi l)
988 (Utah 1988)
The lease in this case provides that if land
lord or tenant is required to resort to litigation
on account of any breach, the successful party
shall recover all costs and expenses including
reasonable attorney fees paid or incurred in
onnection with the litigation Therefore,
because the contract clearly provides that
G G A is entitled to recover attorney fees and
(osts if successful, the court properly awarded
attorney fees and costs Id at 991 ("if reaso
liable fees are recoverable by contract or
statute
it is a mistake of law to award less
than that amount )
G G A is also entitled to attorney fees and
costs incurred on appeal, as the contract pro
vision includes both trial and appeal fees and
costs Jenkins v Bailey, 676 P 2d 391, 393
(Utah 1984) We remand to the trial court for
a detenninition of attorney fees incurred o i
appeal
Affn incd
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VESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
N C , Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D., Lynn L.
VUcox, M.D., and St. Mark's Hospital,
Defendants and Respondents.
to. 880243-CA
1LED: April 28, 1989
"hird District, Salt Lake County
lonorable Richard H. Moffat
ATTORNEYS:
). Clayton Fairbourn, Mid vale, for Appellant
Jliott J. Williams, Larry R. Laycock, Salt
Lake City, for Western Surgical Associates,
Inc. and Martin C. Lindem
. Anthony Eyre, Salt Lake City, for Lynn L.
Wilcox
rary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for St. Mark's
Hospital
efore~ Judges Garff, Greenwood and
ackson.
OPINION
JREENWOOD, Judge:
Charles Floyd brought this action seeking
amages against defendants resulting from
llegedly unnecessary surgery. The trial court
ranted summary judgment for all defendants,
ating that Floyd's claims were barred by the
atute of limitations set forth in Utah Code
j m . §78-14-4 (1987). The court stated
lat Floyd discovered, or through the exercise
f reasonable diligence should have discoved, more than two years before he commeced the action, that he had sustained an
tjury and that the injury was caused by neggent action. We affirm.
After experiencing severe heartburn for
lany years and consulting at least two doctors
bout the problem, Floyd consulted Dr.
/ilcox in November 1981. Dr. Wilcox examled Floyd, told him that he had a hiatal
»rnia and referred him to Dr. Lindem for
lrgery to correct the problem. Floyd met with
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Dr. Lindem and discussed possible hiatal
hernia surgery only. Dr. Lindem told him the
hernia was a tear between the esophagus and
the stomach and the surgical process would
entail pulling the stomach up over the esophagus and tying it in. Neither Dr. Lindem nor
Dr. Wilcox told Floyd that he had ulcers. On
December 8, Dr. Lindem's nurse asked Floyd
to sign a consent form authorizing the surgery.
According to .Floyd, the consent form stated
that the proposed medical treatment was hiatal
hernia surgery only.
On December 9, 1981', Dr, Lindem conducted three surgical procedures on Floyd: 1)
hiatal hernia surgery, also called fundoplication; 2) a vagotomy, which is severance of the
stomach nerves to reduce stomach secretions
and correct ulcer disease; and 3) pylorplasty,
which enlarges the opening from the stomach
to the duodenum to allow the contents of the
stomach to empty more rapidly. At the time
Floyd was discharged from the hospital, he
told Dr. Lindem he had diarrhea and Dr.
Lindem said that it would go away in time.
Over the next few months Floyd's diarrhea
became worse, his stomach was upset almost
continuously, he was depressed and began to
lose weight. In about March or April 1982,
Floyd's wife asked Dr. Lindem what he had
done to Floyd. At that time, Dr. Lindem told
Floyd and his wife that he had performed
additional surgery. According to Floyd, Dr.
Lindem stated that he had repaired the hernia,
removed a portion of his stomach that was
covered with ulcer scars, and cut the nerves in
his stomach and opened up the bottom of his
stomach so he could process food faster. Dr.
Lindem also stated that it might take two or
three years for Floyd to recover. During his
deposition, Floyd testified that in March or
April of 1982, he learned for the first time
that Dr. Lindem had performed surgery he
had never discussed with him and to which he
had not consented. Floyd also stated that he
understood at that time that the unconsented
to surgery caused his diarrhea, upset stomach,
weight loss and depression. Later in the deposition, however, Floyd indicated that he did
not fully realize at that time that Dr. Lindem
had done something that Floyd had not authorized.
In September 1982, Floyd consulted Dr.
Wilcox regarding his ongoing diarrhea, upset
stomach and depression. Floyd stated during
his deposition, that he informed Dr. Wilcox at
that time that Dr. Lindem had performed
surgery in addition to fundoplication and that
his problems were prbbably caused by the
surgery. Dr. Wilcox confirmed that additional
surgery was performed, ran tests on Floyd and
determined that he had "dumping syndrome,"
a condition in which the stomach empties
about ten minutes after eating instead of 77
minutes as with an average stomach. Dr.
Wilcox told Floyd that dumping syndrome
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